Security Database - Leaked Download Work | Iraq National

For the average Iraqi citizen, scrolling through Facebook or Telegram is an act of cognitive risk. For the national security apparatus, every notification is a potential trigger for civil collapse. As one intelligence colonel in Baghdad put it, “We can stop a car bomb at a checkpoint. We cannot stop a rumor at a breakfast table. Until that changes, our border is the most porous one on the internet.”

The Central Bank of Iraq lost millions stabilizing the currency. The culprit? A single anonymous account with 5,000 followers amplified by bot networks. National security in Iraq now includes , as economic panic can topple a government faster than an insurgency. The Government’s Response: The Electronic Army and the Cyber Curtain In response, the Iraqi National Security Service (INSS) has established the "Electronic Intelligence Directorate" – colloquially known as Firqat Al-Ashbah (The Ghost Brigade). This unit monitors over 50,000 high-risk social media accounts daily. iraq national security database - leaked download

For example, a fabricated story suggesting a Shia militia burned a Sunni mosque will appear in the feeds of Sunni users, while a false report of Sunni terrorists targeting a Shia pilgrimage will target the opposite side. These narratives trigger real-world violence. in Iraq often bypasses formal journalism, leading to tribal retaliations before the government can intervene. 2. Deepfake Leadership and Military Disinformation Iraq has seen a disturbing rise in low-quality but effective deepfake audio clips. In 2024, a falsified audio recording of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al-Sudani circulated on WhatsApp, purportedly insulting a senior PMF commander. For 48 hours, tensions spiked to near-coup levels. The government’s National Security Advisory (INSA) was forced to hold a live press conference with timestamps to debunk the clip. For the average Iraqi citizen, scrolling through Facebook

acts as a force multiplier for these non-state actors. Unlike traditional propaganda, which required satellite TV channels (like Al Jazeera or Al Arabiya), modern disinformation in Iraq spreads via WhatsApp, Telegram, and TikTok. These platforms are encrypted, fast, and largely unregulated, making them ideal conduits for destabilization. Case Study: The "Invisible Curfew" Phenomenon In late 2023, a grainy video surfaced on Iraqi Twitter (X). It allegedly showed armed men in unidentified uniforms driving through a quiet neighborhood in Dhi Qar province. Within two hours, the video had 2 million views. The caption read: “Foreign forces re-entering the city. Curfew imminent.” We cannot stop a rumor at a breakfast table